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INTRODUCTION

A surgeon works for years to develop the complex multitude of
attachments and interrelationships of a device to enter the space that
surrounds abdominal organs and perform surgical procedures within.
The paradox of inventorship of a surgical instrument is that for it to
work naturally, sometimes the technology gets very complex. This
abdominal trocar for tiny incision intra-abdominal surgery is one of
the complex kind of surgical inventions. The surgeon inventor enlists
technical help to solve special problems beyond his skill, like
engineering electrical-mechanical circuitry. The surgeon is not so
into the legalities of research that he obtains prior assignment of
patent rights from the helper that he employs. One technician helps
the surgeon to design a tactile feedback component of the device.
The technician's help could be characterized as merely making the
innovator's ideas work without much creativity or fiddling around.
On the other hand the help could be characterized as requiring some
creativity an experimentation leading to a new solution for making
this aspect of the instrument work. The surgeon eventually puts
together his whole device, including the tactile feedback component,
and patents it. However, he does not name the engineer in the patent
application. The surgical community embraces the concept of
minimally invasive abdominal surgery. The device turns out to be
widely accepted by the surgical community, and thus commercially
valuable.
The device is a blockbuster worth mounting a patent fight. If a
competitor could make and sell the surgical device, this would mean
big bucks, either lost by the owner of the patent or gained by the
competitor. The patent presents a problem to a competitor. However,
each and every claim of the patent reads on devices which are
saleable to the surgical community. The competitor could avoid the
claims of the patent by designing around them. This would require
investment in research and development, with the attendant risk of
failure. The competitor could purchase a right to make and use
through a license for a price and if the patent owner were willing to
accept entry of a competing manufacturer into the field. The
competitor could attack the patent in an attempt to render it invalid or
unenforceable. This would require investment in patent litigation
with its risk of failure. The final alternative is for the competitor to
acquire rights of co-ownership in the patent by licensing from the
engineer whatever right he may have in the patent and litigating to
have him named as co-inventor with co-ownership rights. The
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competitor would put the cost of license for arguable ownership fights
and the cost of patent litigation at risk, 1 but the prize would be so
much more attractive. That is, the prevailing competitor could
become a co-owner of the monopoly right. This would be preferable
to an attack on validity because with a successful attack on validity,
the competitor would defeat his own possibility of monopolistic
advantage.
In our situation, the competitor contracts with the engineer to
acquire whatever rights he might have in the ownership of the patent
for the surgical device. The competitor makes an infringing device
The accused
and, not surprisingly, is sued for infringement.
infringer's defense is that the engineer contributed substantially to the
invention. He is a co-inventor, albeit left out of the patent
application. The competitor, as the assignee of the patent rights of the
co-inventor, is the real party in interest. The board is set between two
giants in the surgical instruments industry. They have assets
sufficient to sustain the costs and risks of patent litigation, and a
blockbuster patent that makes the reward worth the pot.
The court agrees that the technician contributed a novel, albeit
small, component of the patent. It names the technician as a coinventor, not only of the component upon which he worked, but of
each and every claim, including the claims to which the technician
never contributed at all. The court holds that for two hundred years
co-ownership rights in a patent have been equivalent to cotenancy
rights in property. It seems the engineer got much more benefit from
being than he contributed, while the surgeon was cheated out of the
just fruits of his inventive genius and investment.
This is the discouraging story of Dr. Yoon and his surgical trocar
designed for minimally invasive entry into the abdominal cavity. 2 He
invented a trocar that punctures the inner wall of the abdominal cavity
(the peritoneum) without puncturing the intestines that lie up against
the inside of the peritoneum. It was a marvelous instrument which
was described with 55 claims in U.S. Patent No. 4,535,773.
1. The litigation costs of an attack based on co-inventorship could be much less than for
an attack on validity. The cost of patent litigation for a patent where a million dollars is at stake
can be $500,000. The cost of patent litigation for patents where more than one hundred million
dollars is at stake can be as high as fifteen million dollars per party, AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 1999, 76-77(1999).
Hypothetically, the incremental litigation cost is for a more exhaustive search for invalidating
prior art. An attack on ownership, in contrast, would be spared the cost of a search for
invalidating prior art.
2. See generally Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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However, because Dr. Yoon was found to be a co-inventor in two of
the claims, he was denied sole ownership of this invention. 3
This is the chilling story of the precarious position into which
any innovator places himself when he discusses his inventive goals
without first attending to assignment of any patent rights that might
arise out of collaboration.4 The non-institutional and non-corporate
individual inventor, prevalent in biomedical research, can lose
possession of patent ownership rights if he does not provide for
assignment of patentable discoveries of his employees and contractors
prior to collaborative participation.
This is also the surprising story of the left out collaborator who
gets let into extensive patent rights through an attack on patent
ownership rights using 35 U.S.C. § 256. 5 Where the left out coinventor contributed less, much less, to all the claimed elements of the
patented invention than did the primary inventor, yet the reward of
co-ownership of patent rights in all the claims is surprisingly
inequitable. As a method of acquiring the advantage of technological
monopolies, patent litigation is favored over research and licensing.
That is, the reward to risk calculus is so skewed for would-be
competitors that finding a likely unnamed co-inventor is highly
favored over licensing and independent development. For the left out
co-inventor, excluding all other competitors but the other co-inventor
is better and less expensive than achieving the status of patent
noninfringement based on invalidity.
Tempted by such
disproportionate rewards a Section 256 defense is better characterized
as a Section 256 attack.
Title 35 U.S.C. §256 provides that a co-inventor omitted from an
issued patent may be added to the patent by a court. 6 Title 35 U.S.C.
3. Id. at 1465. See infra, Part VI.
4. See generally Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (inventor of shape
of intraocular lens discussed with intraocular lens manufacturer about structure of intraocular
lens and claimed structure without naming manufacturer as co-inventor, manufacturer
prevailed). See also Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1782 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inventors of balloon angioplasty catheter discussed with technician about
heat shrinkable material for tubing without naming technician as co-inventor, technician failed
to prevail).
5. The majority in Ethicon found that the engineer, Mr. Choi, owned an equal share of all
of the claims, even those that were exclusively invented by Mr. Yoon. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at
1466. See infra, Part VI.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994). "The court before which such matter is called in question may
order correction of the patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned and the
Commissioner shall issue a certificate accordingly." Further, 35 U.S.C. § 116 3 (1994), a
companion section to § 256, provides for similar powers vested in the Commissioner of Patents
in an application for patent.
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§ 116 1, as amended in 1984, provides that a person may be named
a co-inventor of a patent even if he did not make a contribution to
each claim of the patent.7 The bane for the named inventor and the
bounty for the added co-inventor are that the Congress did not specify
in the Code the scope of the rights an added co-inventor acquires after
being added to the patent or when and whether a left out contributor
should be added as a co-inventor to the patent. Of all the
circumstances that the court could have chosen as a basis for granting
co-inventor status under the changed § 116 1 landscape, the Ethicon
court chose conception of any element of the complete invention. Of
all the rights that a court could conceivably grant as remedy to the
omitted co-inventor, the Ethicon court chose that a co-inventor added

to a patent pursuant to § 256 under the amended § 116

1 acquired

undivided co-ownership rights in all the claims of the patent, whether
the added co-inventor contributed to each claim or not.8 Additionally,
the Ethicon court held that all co-owners, including the newly added
co-inventor, must be joined in order to press a claim of infringement. 9

A refusal by the added co-inventor to join such a claim as plaintiff
required dismissal of that infringement action *0 When the newly
added co-inventor is the accused infringer, the benefits of a successful
Even the issue of past
§ 256 defense/attack are enhanced.
Whenever through error a person is named in an application for a patent as the
inventor, or through error an inventor is not named in an application, and such
error arose without any deceptive intention on his part, the Commissioner may
permit the application to be amended accordingly, under such terms as he
prescribes.
Amendments under § 116 are limited to circumstances where the applicants are in agreement as
to co-inventorship and affirm no deceptive intent.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did not physically work together
or at the same time, (2) each did not make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each
did not make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.
8. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465.
9. Id. at 1465.
10. See id. at 1466-68. As a third holding, the co-ownership of patent rights became
effective as of the date of the court ordered correction. Rights attendant to requirement of
joinder of all co-inventors to pursue an infringement claim became effective as of the date of the
court ordered correction. If an infringement suit was begun prior to correction, and the newly
added co-inventor refused to join the suit, the suit must be dismissed. The added co-inventor
could not release an alleged infringer from liability for past accrued damages to named coinventor, but if the added co-inventor refused to join such a suit required dismissal. Presumably,
if an infringement suit had been already completed, the added co-inventor could not overturn
that result. The litigation issue here is that if the putative co-inventor licenses his ownership
rights in the patent to the party accused of infringement, the infringer licensee can use § 256 as a
defense to accomplish dismissal of the infringement action and as an offense to be named as colicensee of at least some of the patent claims.
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infringement becomes moot.
The dissent correctly pointed out the problem with the majority's
holding: the result was inequitable as it gave the newly added coinventor full rights with respect to claims for which he made no
contribution, even when those claims formed the overwhelming basis
for the patent." Such a disproportionate result presented a windfall
for the omitted co-inventor and his assignee.
In order to assess the Ethicon holding, this paper will trace the
historical development of the doctrines of property rights and coinventorship in patents to give meaning to the correlation between
cotenancy rights in property and co-ownership rights in patents after
the amendment of § 116 1. Under the current co-inventorship rules,
this paper will discuss the alternatives the courts have in awarding
rights to omitted co-inventors. One of the alternatives may be for the
court to adjust its analysis of subsequent cases to dilute the perceived
inequitable windfall of equal ownership rights granted to the added
co-inventor. 2 Finally, this paper suggests remedial actions on the part
of the courts, Congress and the Patent and Trademark Office.
II. THE OWNERSHIP/INVENTORSHIP PARADIGM
In order to examine the alternatives available to the courts when
considering which of the bundle of property rights to grant to a left
out co-inventor, it is necessary to examine the historical background
of the interdependent relationship between the high standard for coinventorship and the granting of the complete bundle of cotenancy
rights to co-inventors. The precedential history of granting cotenancy property rights in patents is co-dependent on limiting coinventorship to substantial and simultaneous contribution by each coinventor to each and every element of each and every claim of the
patent. With the passage of 35 USC § 116 in 1984, Congress altered
the co-inventorship moiety of this paradigm. This fundamentally
altered the codependent relationship between co-inventorship and coownership. The requirement that co-inventors be co-tenants in patent
ownership was left without precedential support where collaborators
contributed substantially differently to different elements of the
invention. The meaning of the co-ownership moiety was not
specified by Congress and is not specified in precedent under
11. See id. at 1468-72.
12. See Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351 (left out collaborator as to one claim may not exclude
named inventor from all claims where there is a bar based on prior placement of the invention

into the art).
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conditions of this altered paradigm. Court precedent does not demand
inequitable results that favor litigation over research.
Early Code allowed that more than one inventor could contribute
to a patent both through the use of plural forms ("inventors") in literal
construction and through the general allowance of the understanding
13
of the singular to mean plural throughout the statute.
Originally, the courts' concept of valid co-inventorship was
limited to simultaneous, substantial contribution to each and every
element of the invention by each and every co-inventor. Another way
of expressing this rule is one inventor, one invention, one patent, or,
14
as a begrudging alternative, co-inventors, one invention, one patent.
Thus, although the Code did not prohibit co-inventors, early case
law sharply limited the circumstances under which co-inventors could
be recognized. As stated by the Supreme Court:
The settled rule of law is, that whoever first perfects a machine is
entitled to the patent, and is the real inventor, although others may
have previously had the idea and made some experiments towards
putting it in practice. He is the inventor and is entitled to the
patent who first brought the machine to perfection and made it
15
capable of useful operation.
Likewise from a contemporaneous circuit court decision:
[B]y the patent act, no person could entitle himself to a patent for
any machine, unless he was the true inventor of it ....

By the

expression in the statute, 'true inventor,' is undoubtedly meant the
sole and exclusive inventor; for if the machine were the joint
invention of several persons, neither of them could claim to be the
true inventor, having an exclusive title to the patent; but the
interest would be a joint or common interest in the whole. In such
a case, therefore, if a party were to obtain a patent for the
invention, having sworn, that he was the true inventor, he would,
13. See 8 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS, app. 1 (1999).
14. See Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 317, 3 Story 133 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No.
17,214).
15. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1869). Although Justice Story referenced
Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story, 133 as the source of his paraphrase in Agawam, the court in
Washburn, when it made this statement, was concerned with the issue as to whether the inventor
had put together old elements into a new invention so as to be entitled to a valid patent. "The
law is, that whoever first perfects a machine, is entitled to the patent, and is the real inventor,
although others may previously have had the idea, and made some experiments towards putting
it in practice.." Washburn 29 F.Cas. at 317. The Court in Agawam goes beyond this accepted
principle to reach a higher standard for joint invention of "inventing" the 'entire invention,' "a
complete and perfect machine, embracing the substance of all that is embodied in the patent."
Nevertheless, the Agawam case was concerned with patent invalidation, and could be thought of
as limited to this circumstance, instead of being extended to an action for naming as co-inventor.
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in the language of the act, obtain it "upon false suggestion"; and as
such false suggestion would be a surprise and fraud upon the
government, it might well also be declared to be obtained
"surreptitiously." 16

Compared to modem standards, there was extreme reluctance in
early case holdings to recognize co-inventorship. For example, only
when forced by a special finding of fact by the jury "that the plaintiff
and defendant were both concerned in the invention..." did the court
allow "that the invention was the result of their joint, and not of their
17
several and independent labors."'
The judicial reluctance toward allowing co-inventorship
expressed itself by requiring a high standard for conception and
contribution. The high standard required simultaneous conception
and reduction to practice by the collaborators. 8 Each named coinventor had to jointly conceive and contribute substantially the same
to each element of the invention claimed to be granted joint patent
rights. 9
Not finding a simultaneous and substantially similar contribution
to each element of the whole invention by each putative co-inventor,
the courts were likely to find that the co-inventor who contributed to
less than every element of the invention was merely an assistant and
not entitled to any of the rights flowing from the issued letters patent.
If one co-inventor did not contribute as much to all of the elements of
a single invention as the other, the court was likely to find against the
former, and invalidate the patent. As stated in an early District Court
decision:
[The inventors] were entitled to a joint patent for what they jointly
invented. It may be that their minds co-operated in combining the
different parts which resulted in the production of the complete
machine, but a joint patent can be sustained only for a joint
invention; and the evidence shows that [one of the inventors] did
20
not contribute to the invention covered by the tenth claim.

16. Steams v. Barret, 22 F. Cas. 1175 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816), Case no. 13,337, 1 Mason,
153, the circuit judge overturning the district court holding based on the jury's finding, 'that the
plaintiff and defendant were both concerned in the invention.'
17. Seeid. at 1181.
18. See id. (requiring for the status of joint invention "simultaneous production of the
genius and labor of both parties.")
19. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
20. Stewart v. Tenk, 32 F. 665, 666 (C.C.S.D. l. 1887) (concerning a patent issued on an
invention with twelve claims, one claim contributed to by only one co-inventor, the patent
issued jointly was invalid).
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Another judicial approach which preserved the relationship
between co-invention and co-ownership was to consider the employee
contributor who provided less to the invention than an assistant who
merely improved on the main design. As expressed in 1874 by the
Court:
Where a person has discovered a new and useful principle in a
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, he may employ
other persons to assist in carrying out that principle, and if they, in
the course of experiments arising from that employment, make
discoveries ancillary to the plan and preconceived design of the
employer, such suggested improvements are in general to be
regarded as the property of the party who discovered the original
principle, and they may be embodied in his patent as part of his
invention. 2
On the other hand, courts found inventorship for the employee
when he made a substantial and separate invention from his employer.
"[P]ersons employed.., are entitled to their own independent
inventions.... if the suggestions communicated [to the employer]
constitute the whole substance of the improvement.... " 22 Thus, early
courts held that either party could be the inventor and the alternate
party the assistant, but early courts rarely held more than one party
could jointly share co-inventorship of the patented invention.
There was another judicially acceptable alternative which
preserved the strict relation between coinvention and co-ownership
for the situation where one co-inventor contributed in a different way
to different elements of an invention than did another. The subject
matter was expected to be divided into separate inventions, each
invention limited to the elements that were the subject matter of the
substantial simultaneous contribution of all co-inventors named.
Even here the preference was for a single inventor for a single
invention. As one court stated, "If... one person invents a distinct
part of a machine, and another person invents another distinct and
independent part of the same machine, then each should obtain a
patent for his own invention." 23 Thus, when the plaintiff and
defendant separately and independently invented several parts of the
machine, capable of a distinct use, then those parts might be
21. Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. 530,563-64 (1875).
22. Id. at 564.
23. Worden v. Fisher, 11 F. 505, 509 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1882) (finding that one element in
the patent was properly considered the sole contribution of one co-inventor, but was useless
without the contributions of the other co-inventor, and affirming the co-inventorship status of
the patentees).
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considered as separate inventions, for which each inventor could be
entitled to a separate patent.24
The penalty for violating the rule of simultaneous and
substantially equal contribution was harsh. If a patent covering more
than one element issued to two co-inventors, one of whom did not
contribute to all the elements, then the patent was entirely void and
could not be reissued to either inventor. There was no statutory basis
to reissue the patent to the co-inventors when it originally was issued
to only one inventor.25 The patent Code provided only that:
Whenever any patent is inoperative or invalid, by reason of a
defective or insufficient specification, or by reason of the patentee
claiming as his own invention or discovery more than he had a
right to claim as new, if the error has arisen by inadvertence,
accident, or mistake... the commissioner shall... cause a new
patent... to be issued to the patentee, or... to his executors,
administrators or assigns, for the unexpired part of the term of the
26
original patent ....
However, this section was constructed as allowing reissue only
upon clerical error of the patenting office, since it seemed
incongruous to reissue a patent for matter that could not have been
patented in the first instance due to an inventor having been joined in
error for an element to which he did not contribute.27 "[T]he [Patent]
Department cannot, by means of alterations or corrections, confirm or
''28
impart validity to a patent which was originally void.
The reason for favoring single inventors and requiring a high
standard to be named as co-inventor was that every person named to
the letters patent enjoyed undivided ownership rights in the patent. It
would thus be inequitable to grant undivided rights to all the elements
of a patent unless each inventor substantially contributed to all the
elements. Under circumstances
that the person named did not invent nor suggest the entire
invention ....
common justice would forbid that any partial aid
rendered under such circumstances, during the progress of
experiments in perfecting the improvement, should enable the
24. See Steams, 22 F. Cas. at 1181 (1816).
25. In re Hamilton, 37 F.2d 758, 759 (CCPA 1930) (even if co-inventor who did not
contribute to some of the claims was included in the application for all of the claims
inadvertently, patent may not be reissued. Sole remedy is to attempt to file for new patent).

26. 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1868).
27.

See Hanilton, 37 F.2d at 758-59 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 64 (1868) relying on Ex

parte Barsaloux, August 7, 1878, C.D. 1878, 154).
28.

Id. at 759.
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person rendering the aid to appropriate to himself the entire result
of the ingenuity and toil of the originator, or put it in the power of
any subsequent infringer to defeat the patent under the plea that the
invention was made by the assistant and not by the originator of
the plan. 29

This is circular reasoning which supports a logical paradigm, or
at least reasoning based on interdependent principles. At one place in
the circle is the proposition that if patent doctrine only allows for
equal and undivided cotenancy ownership rights to all the claims of a
patent, then, in order to equitably uphold patent statutory law, a court
should uphold the validity of only that patent where each person
named as co-inventor contributed equally and undividedly to all the
claims describing the invention. The converse proposition is
conceivable, namely to allow valid issue of patents to co-inventors
who did not contribute in the above way, if patent law were to allow
provision for unequal and divided ownership rights. However, the
converse proposition was not explored, perhaps because the
equivalency of property interests in a patent and cotenancy rights in
real property was taken as a given. Another way to explain this was
that patent law is statutory, staying within the circle of linguistics and
logic of joint inventorship equivalency to cotenancy ownership of
patent property interests permitted courts to do equity within statutory
confines using the strict substantial simultaneous contribution rule.
But the former logical and linguistic circle was used to express
the precedential foundation for property rights that arose as a result of
coinvention. Each co-inventor acquired undivided rights in all the
elements of the whole patent. This made it just and imperative that
each co-inventor contribute equally to all the elements of the
invention. It was a way to resolve the tension between antipathy
toward monopolies, on the one hand, and the sense that at least a
single inventor should have rights to the fruits of his creative effort,
on the other hand.
The "simultaneous equal contribution to each and every
element" rule of co-inventorship carried forward into the twentieth
century.
Patent applications were denied, 30 or issued patents
invalidated, simply because all of the named inventors did not
contribute to all the claims, or because contributors to some of the

29. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 603-604 (1868).
30. See R.K. Le Blond Mach. Tool Co. v. Wickes Bros., 23 F. Supp. 371 (E.D. Mich.
1937) (co-inventor could not properly apply for patent with claims which were invented by the
other co-inventor). See also In re Carlson, 79 F.2d 900 C.C.P.A. (1935).
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claims were not named."'" In the case of a patent issued jointly to two
co-inventors, where one co-inventor did not contribute to some of the
claims, the patent was held invalid and incapable of reissue.3 2 The
courts used the strict simultaneous substantial contribution rule
frequently as a precedential basis to defeat defenses against
33
infringement actions based on allegations of co-inventor status.
Defenses to infringement actions claiming co-inventorship were
defeated on grounds of lack of clear and convincing proof. The
articulated standard for co-inventorship was that the two inventors
collaborated in evolving the patented device and worked together for
a common end which was finally accomplished by the contributions
and united efforts of both.34 Co-Inventors had to proceed from
conception to inventive result by mutual consultations and
suggestions, otherwise a court would uphold findings of sole
3
inventorship to defeat defense of co-inventorship. 1
There was evidence in the twentieth century of softening of the
strict rule. It was more a liberalization of standards than a fabrication
of new doctrines, but the effect sought was to balance equities in a
new technological era. Thus, instead of fashioning a new doctrine to
distinguish property rights of co-inventors from property rights in real
property, the courts showed more willingness to uphold findings of
patent validity by co-inventors based on liberalized interpretations of
the meaning of substantial contribution.
First, the courts lowered the standard for what was necessary to
gain co-inventor status. Occasionally, a court would find that the
issue was not critical whether there were joint inventors or a sole
inventor,36 at least in the instance of amending an application where a
31. See Wailes Dove-Hermiston Corp. v. Oklahoma Contracting Co., 48 F.2d 901 (N.D.
Tex. 1931) affd. 56 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1932) (when there are more than one co-inventor, all
must apply for a patent); Bannerman v. Sanford, 99 F. 294 (2d Cir. 1900) (when a machine was
the joint product of two men, who built it together, neither can secure a valid patent as the sole
inventor). See generallySmart v. Wright, 227 F. 84 (8th Cir. 1915). See also 35 U.S.C.A. § 116
(for more examples). Cf.Ethicon, 135 F.3d. at 1469 (a string of cites to cases where the issues of
co-inventorship was cited to in the rule of law, but the holdings varied according to the facts).
32. See Hamilton, 37 F.2d at 759 (joint patent invalid due to some elements being
contributed to only one inventor, and incapable of reissue).

33. See Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp., 177 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1949) (in case of a joint
invention, patent issued to only one inventor invalid).
34. Id. at 157 relying on McKinnon Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 268 F. 353, 360
(3d Cir. 1920).

35. See Hobbs v. United States, 451 F.2d 849, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1971).
36. See American Patent Diamond Dop Co. v. Wood, 189 F. 391 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1911)
rev'd on other grounds, 198 F. 401 (2d. Cir. 1912) (that one of two joint patentees alone
invented certain of the elements of a combination did not invalidate the patent). See also Haskell
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joint inventor was named in error inadvertently. 37 Second, this
increased willingness to allow co-inventorship was expressed in a line
of cases which upheld that there should be a presumption that the
inventors named in an issued patent were correct, even if more than
one inventor.3s Third, and related to the second point above, this
increased willingness to allow co-inventorship was expressed in more
or less the same line of cases requiring proof of misjoinder (and nonjoinder) of more or less than the true inventors by a "clear and
convincing" standard to invalidate patents. 39 Historically, the
precedents most frequently used the clear and convincing standard to
defeat attempts to invalidate an issued patent. As early as Agawam,
continuing through a line of cases 4° into the twentieth century41 and up
to recent years, 42 the courts have used the clear and convincing
standard to defeat patents with co-inventors claiming rights. As one
court stated, "[t]he temptation for honest witnesses, who have worked
years with a patentee to implement his ideas, to forget whose ideas
they were, is very strong. For this reason, it has been well established
that joint inventorship must be proven by clear and convincing
43
evidence."
However, the courts have displayed in the twentieth century a
growing tendency to uphold the validity of a patent with co-

v. Coleboume, 671 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (C.C.P.A. 1982) ("evidence of conception naming only
one of true inventive entity... [members could] inure to benefit of and serve as evidence of
conception by... complete inventive entity, whether initially thought to be joint inventors or
only considered to be such later upon change of inventorship").
37. See Monsanto Co. v. Kamp, 269 F. Supp. 818 (D.D.C. 1967).
38. See Jamesbury Corp. v. United States, 518 F.2d 1384 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See also Acme
Highway Products Corp. v. D.S. Brown Co., 431 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1971); Mueller Brass Co.
v. Reading Industries, 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1973);
Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.Wash. 1993) (once a patent
issues it is presumed valid and one attacking its validity based on misjoinder or non-joinder
carries burden of establishing improper inventorship by clear and convincing evidence). See also
Staehelin v. Secher, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513, 1522 (1992) ("evidence of conception naming only
one of the actual inventive entities inures to the benefit of and serves as evidence of conception
by the complete inventive entity").
39. See Garrett Corp. v. United States, 422 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See generally Acme
Highway at 1083; Stein v. Biocoustics, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 680 (D.D.C. 1973); Congoleum
Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 339 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D.Pa. 1972); Jamesbury at 1395.
40. See Washbum & Moen Mfg. Co. v. Beat 'Em All Barbed-Wire Co. ("The Barbed
Wire Patent'), 143 U.S. 275,284-85 (1892); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881).
41. See Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45,60 (1923).
42. See Acme Highway, 431 F.2d at 1083; Amax Fly Ash Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d
1041 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (as a defense against charge of infringement, party alleging co-inventor
status defeated on basis of lack of clear and convincing evidence).
43. Acme Highway, 431 F.2d at 1083.
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inventorship at issue. For example, the court in Mueller Brass 44 was
extremely deferential toward upholding co-inventorship. In the face
of insubstantial and non-simultaneous contribution to all of the
claimed elements by a collaborator named as co-inventor, the court
held it unnecessary to invalidate the patent, absent deceptive intent,
on policy grounds of doing justice in these circumstances. 45 As stated
by the court, "[t]his situation does make it difficult to say, however,
with real certainty, whether or not a given person 'is' a joint inventor
in a given case. It is a question most often resolved as much on
'46
policy as on metaphysics.
Research in the technological era ran increasingly afoul of the
substantial, simultaneous contribution to each element rule. As if not
metaphysical enough to define the difference between co-inventorship
and sole invention when only one assistant is helping develop the
invention, the rule which demanded substantial, simultaneous
contribution to each element became qualitatively disjointed from the
common reality of modem methods of research in the mid to late
twentieth century. Inventions became more complex, partly because
market forces made it profitable for ever larger institutions, both
corporate and non-corporate, to tackle research and development of
ever more complex goods and services. Larger institutions have been
successful in developing useful technology using a method organizing
compartmentalized and departmentalized research teams to develop
different but related technological aspects of complex inventions.
These teams not only might not work simultaneously, they may come
from different technical backgrounds so that they do not substantially
contribute to each element of the complex invention. Corporate
research mandated continuing research on an invention despite
whether one or another collaborator on an element continued on with
the project or even continued employment with the institution
sponsoring the research and development. Chemical research, for
instance, was fragmented into the organic chemistry of producing the
product in a form suitable for use, and, separately, the proof that the
chemical produced had utility in use under the conditions for which it
was designed. At an extreme, in the drug chemistry niche, the gap
between producing congeners and the clinical research to prove utility
that was safe and effective enough to satisfy Food and Drug

44.
45.

Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
The standard of review to invalidate the patent was clear and convincing proof of

invalidity.
46. Mueller,352 F. Supp at 1373.
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Administration precautions became enormous, both in terms of talent
of the researchers and capital. The historical doctrines of separate
patent applications, each naming only those co-inventors who strictly
contributed to the limited claims specified, did not meet industry
objectives, especially where production and proof of utility were so
separate. The original Constitutionally-mandated policy that the
patent belongs to the inventor and no one else and the utility of the
strict doctrine to deny allegations of co-inventorship to the defense in
infringement claims conflicted with industry desires to obtain patent
protection for developments that necessitated co-inventors who
contributed differently, at different times, to different claims. "If
different persons made an inventive contribution to various parts of an
invention or to different claims of a patent, the legalistic problems
that arose were not readily soluble, even by the complex, expensive,
and often confusing expedient of filing separate patent applications on
separate claims." 47 Alternative requirements for co-inventorship
could be fashioned which satisfied the needs of modem institutional
research without surrendering the policy of incentivizing the inventor,
and no one else, that historically supported the strict simultaneous
substantially equal contribution doctrine.

I. AMENDMENT OF § 116 IN 1984 UPSET THE
OWNERSHIP/INVENTORSHIP PARADIGM
In 1984 Congress did fashion an amendment to 35 U.S.C. §116,
clarifying the statutory requirement for co-inventorship in a way
which "recognizes the realities of modem team research." 48 As
amended in 1984, §116 provides that collaborators may apply for a
joint patent even though they did not physically work together or at
the same time or did not make a contribution to the subject matter of
all the claims, and such an issued patent would not be invalid for lack
of fulfilling the strict rule of simultaneous, substantially equal
contribution to each and every element. 49 As stated:
Inventors may apply for a patent jointly even though (1) they did
not physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not
make the same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not
make a contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the

47. Ethicon, 135 F.3d. at 1469 (Newman, J., dissenting).
48. 130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (daily edition Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeyer).
See also 1984 U.S. Code Cong. And Adm. News, p. 5827 for legislative history and purpose.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994). Amendment by Pub. L. 98-622.
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patent.

In view of the analysis above, the amendment could be
interpreted as a Congressional approval for what was already a
judicial trend to relax the strict rule against co-inventorship. Perhaps,
Congress was more concerned with acknowledging the realities of
modem research in teams, while the judiciary was more concerned
with justifying its perceived need for freedom to do justice in
particular circumstances within the phraseology imposed by
precedents.
However, in amending § 116 Congress did not address the
ownership rights that accrued to inventorship in all situations. What
was not addressed by Congress, and hence left to the judiciary to
interpret, was the foundational correlative upon which the necessity of
the strict rules for co-inventorship was built in the first place. The
strict rules limiting who had a right to be named as joint inventor
grew out of the requirements flowing from the rights granted to
patentees. Patentees enjoyed undivided rights in the entire patent.
Therefore, only contributors who developed the entire invention in an
undivided fashion could rightfully enjoy those rights.
The implications to ownership that resulted from breaking this
paradigm at the joint inventor moiety were not considered by
Congress because the effects were usually not significant to a large
modem research institution for whom the relief from the strict rule for
coinventorship was fashioned. A conflict over ownership of
discoveries between the institution and employees or contractors
would not often arise retrospectively, because everyone and anyone
who could possibly lay claim to contribution to a technological
development had contractually settled assignment of ownership rights
prior to collaboration. Most of the time the joint inventors are all
employees of the same organization sponsoring and organizing the
research project. Otherwise, in a joint venture between institutions,
there is prior assignment and licensing agreements. To institutional
research and development entities, it does not matter who gets named
to the patent as co-inventor because the institution has been assigned
all property rights. The institutional researcher with prior assignment
of property rights is only interested that the patent which the
institution wholly owns not be invalidated for improper naming of coinventors based on deceptive intent.

50. Id. Note a distinction. From a facial reading of the statute, a patent may not issue if
the inventors knew nothing at all about each others work.
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To non-institutional inventors who have not prospectively settled
ownership rights in discoveries, however, it is critical whether the
concept of ownership is necessarily congruent with the concept of
inventorship. Courts have recognized the incongruity:
It is elementary that inventorship and ownership are separate
issues... . [I]nventorship is a question of who actually invented the
subject matter claimed in a patent. Ownership, however, is a
in a
question of who owns legal title to the subject matter claimed
51
patent, patents having the attributes of personal property.
The Patent Code does not make the distinction between the
issues clear. Instead, the Code seems to conflate the issues. "Subject
to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of
personal property."5 2 Inventorship and patent ownership are separate,
but interrelated, issues.
Thus, although it does not make a difference when all rights of
ownership are vested in one party, it does make a difference when
there is not a predetermined agreement concerning the limit of
ownership rights and the limits of each patent. This seems to happen
in cases where an individual develops an advancement, using more or
less the contribution of others with respect to various aspects of the
development, without a prior intellectual property policy that
anticipates assignment of patent rights.5 3 The small inventor may not
be sufficiently savvy about statutory and court ordered rights of
collaborators in his invention to preemptively assign ownership

rights.
The amended § 116 1 allows for relaxation of the requirements
for validity of a patent based on who is named as a co-inventor for the
benefit of large institutional research programs, but the amended
statute does not relax the harsh results on ownership rights to the
small inventor when a collaborator is added to a patent. Section 116
effectively lowers the burden carried by a putative joint inventor to be
named to the patent. Lack of substantial simultaneous contribution to
each claim is no longer a statutory bar. But while the impediments to
becoming a joint inventor have been statutorily lowered, the rights
awarded to such a prevailing joint inventor have not been expressly

51. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. Kan. 1993)
(discussing rights of ownership as to vesting giving rise to priority rights in an interference
proceeding as shown in 35 U.S.C. §116).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
53. See generally Ethicon, 135 F.3d 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Pannu, 155 F.3d 1344 (1998),
Hess, 106 F.3d 976 (1997).
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modified. Even though a newly named joint inventor may not have
contributed to a claim or claims of a complex invention, he could
obtain undivided rights to all the claims if the established ownership
rules, which prior to the amendment of § 116 meshed well with the
strict rules of co-inventorship, prevailed.
There are several property rights that accrue to the owner of a
patent. The first set of rights flowing from a patent that comes to
mind is the statutorily granted right of the holder or joint holders to
exclude others from making, using or selling the subject matter of his
or their patent during the term of the patent. This right is analogous
to the right of exclusion flowing from ownership of real property.
Although the right to exclude is statutorily determined, the meaning
of co-ownership in patent rights has been court determined. The
rights flowing from ownership in real property and patents for coowners are judicial interpretations which depend for their integrity
and fairness on balancing the interests recognized. It is fair to closely
correlate co-ownership rights in patents to cotenancy rights in
property when co-inventorship is based on substantially equal
contribution. Congress has changed the statutory requirements for coinventorship, but Congress did not address by statute the meaning of
co-ownership in a patent where there is the unequal contribution
allowed in the amendment, leaving it to the courts to fashion
appropriate property lawA4 It would not be in violation of patent
statute or Congressional intent for the court to fashion equitable
property rights in patents under the changed code. "Thus, where
inventors choose to cooperate in the inventive process, their joint
inventions may become joint property without some express
agreement to the contrary." 55 The "may" aspect of this statement is
rooted in common law. It makes sense and is just where there has
been equal contribution or prior agreement to share the rights in the
invention as common property held in co-tenancy. Whether such a
conclusion of cotenancy rights in jointly owned property "should" or
"must" be drawn in the situation of co-inventors of patents is
conceivably open to discussion.
Undivided property rights in all the claims of a patent do not
have to flow to each co-inventor as a result of co-inventorship status.

54. The basis for this paradigm shift is based on the amount and quality of contribution in
order to ascend to vesting in the associated property interests. The basis for the shift is not the
intangible nature of intellectual property as contrasted with the tangible nature of real property
and chattel. But see dissent in Ethicon, 135 F.3d 1456, 1470-1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 1466.
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The rights associated with concurrent ownership in intellectual patent
property are not congruent with rights associated with concurrent

ownership in tangible property; there are comparisons and contrasts in
existing law.
There are several ways to express property rights in tangible
property: sole ownership,5 6 tenancy in common,5 7 joint tenancy 5 8 and
tenancy by the entirety.5 9 Some principles of real property rights do

not analogously transfer neatly to patent intellectual property, such as
the doctrine of adverse possession. The owner of a patent does not

lose any rights as a result of his not using the patent when another

infringes the patent in open defiance of the true owner.60 Some
doctrines of real property rights have not applied to patents, such as
the abandoned fee tail estate of possession.6' Similarly, the common
law rules of severance as applied to tenancy in common were never
applied to rights of patentees in concurrent ownership of a patent.
There is no procedure for co-owners of a patent to apply to a court to
divide up their ownership interests as there is for real property.
The courts could properly and equitably use most of the tenancy
in common model of property rights as long as the rights awarded co-

patentees closely approximated the contributions that each coinventor made to the invention. Amendment of § 116 changed the
56. A sole owner in real property has undivided rights of exclusion, possession, use, and
title rights. Compare the corresponding rights of ownership of real property to ownership in
patent property: the owner of real property has the right of exclusion, while the owner of patent
property rights likewise has the analogous right to exclude others from making, selling or using
his invention. Contrast the corresponding rights of ownership of real property with ownership in
patent property: the owner of real property has the rights to use and possess, while the owner of
patent property right lacks the right to himself make, use or sell.
57. Each co-tenant in a tenancy in common has an undivided interest in the property,
including the sight to possession of the whole. When one co-tenant dies, the remaining tenants in
common have no survivorship rights. See generally Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier,
Property, 326-327 (3d. ed. 1993)
58. Each co-tenant in a joint tenancy has an undivided interest in the property, including
the right to possession of the whole. When one co-tenant dies, the remaining tenants in joint
tenancy has the right to the whole estate. Interests in joint tenancy can be severed, creating a
tenancy in common. Contrast to corresponding sights in patent: upon death of one co-patentee,
the remaining co-patentee does not succeed to the property rights of the deceased co-patentee.
See id.
59. Each co-tenant in a tenancy by entirety has the same rights as in a joint tenancy,
except that severance by one tenant is invalid. (This tenancy can be created only as between
husband and wife.) See id.
60. Compare the intellectual property of trademark. Disuse of a trademark results is loss
of rights, although use of a trademark adverse to the rightful mark holder does not dispossess
him of his mark.
61. Fee tail estate of possession. Upon death of the owner, complete ownership of the
estate passes to the eldest male heir.
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last part of that paradigm. A holding of undivided and equal rights in
all the claims makes better equitable sense the more closely there is
equal contribution to each element of the claimed invention. At the
other end of the spectrum, divided and unequal rights in the patent
make better equitable sense the more the co-inventors' contributions
are different, as can be the circumstances under current patent law.
IV. UNDIVIDED Co-OWNERSHIP DEPENDS ON SUBSTANTIAL COINVENTORSHIP

At one level, statute expressly creates or implicitly authorizes
ownership of monopolistic rights in a patent. At another level, courts
interpret the meaning of ownership rights in the context of patent
concurrent ownership in accordance with the perceived intention of
Congress. As expressed by the Supreme Court in 1850:
[T]he monopoly granted to the patentee is for one entire thing; it is
the exclusive right of making, using, and vending to others to be
used, the improvement he has invented, and for which the patent is
granted. The monopoly did not exist at common law, and the

rights, therefore, which may be exercised under it cannot be
regulated by the rules of the common law. It is created by the act
of Congress; and no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized
62
by statute, and in the manner the statute prescribes.

With respect to the relationship between a single inventorassignor and a single assignee in assignment of ownership interest,
joint ownership was upheld along a tenancy-in-common model.
By the eleventh section of the Act of 1836, the patentee may assign
his whole interest, or an undivided part of it. But if he assigns a

part under this section, it must be an undivided portion of his entire
interest under the patent, placing the assignee upon an equal

62. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 476,493 (1850). For a line of authorities analyzing some of
the implied rights that a patentee acquires, see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 548
(1852) (when patentee grants unrestricted license, he gives undivided interest in monopoly for
the term of the patent, as extended by statute); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 503 (1879)
(patentee granted rights by federal statute with reference to general powers which the states
possess over their purely domestic affairs whether of internal commerce or of police); United
States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224, 249 (1897) (at a time when the term of the patent
was for seventeen years after issue, a fourteen year delay on the part of the Patent Office,
government may not reduce the right to term of the patentee); Bement v. National Harrow Co.,
186 U. S. 70, 90-92 (1902) (patentee has right to restrict license to one licensee and restrict the
terms under which products may be made and sold, and not in violation of anti-trust) ;
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 424-425 (1908) (patent
absolute property of inventor, in context that inventor need not put patent to use to enjoy
property rights for the term of the patent).
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footing with himself for the part assigned. Upon such an
assignment, the patentee and his assignees become joint owners of
the whole interest secured by the patent, according to the
63
respective proportions which the assignment creates.
There is reason for granting undivided rights in the setting of
assignation of patent rights.
[I]t was obviously not the intention of the legislature to permit
several monopolies to be made out of one, and divided among
different persons within the same [geographic and temporal] limits.
Such a division would inevitably lead to fraudulent impositions
upon persons who desired to purchase the use of the improvement,
and would subject a party who, under a mistake as to his rights,
used the invention without authority, to be harassed by a
multiplicity of suits instead of one, and to successive recoveries of
damages by different persons holding different portions of the
patent right in the same place.64
In the areas of licensing, assignment or transfers of patent rights,
and dependent infringement actions, the concept of undivided
fractional shares of co-owners of the patent rights makes good
equitable sense.
Cases which have been read as requiring undivided rights of the
co-patentees where there was no contractual assignment can be
distinguished. These cases equitably balance interests of the coowners as long as the circumstances are limited to situations where
the co-inventors did not make substantially different contributions.
"[T]he law of shared ownership was founded on shared invention, a
situation that.., does not here prevail [the situation of a left out coinventor being declared co-inventor] .65
Concerning a defense to infringement based on allegations of
lack of sole inventorship by the patentee, the court in Agawam held
that there must be a high degree of disparity between the contribution
of the putative co-inventor compared to the patent holder in order to
invalidate the patent:
Suggestions from another, made during the progress of such
experiments, in order that they may be sufficient to defeat a patent
subsequently issued, must have embraced the plan of the
improvement, and must have furnished such information to the
person to whom the communication was made that it would have
63.
64.
65.

Gayler,51 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 493-494. Cf.Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 542 as to term of reissued patent.
Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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enabled an ordinary mechanic, without the exercise of any
ingenuity and special skill on his part, to construct and put the
66
improvement in successful operation.

This was because the court felt constrained to only consider sole
inventorship under circumstances of contributions that were not so
high.
Such a defense cannot be successful unless it is proved, as
common justice would forbid that any partial aid rendered under
such circumstances, during the progress of experiments in
perfecting the improvement, should enable the person rendering
the aid to appropriate to himself the entire result of the ingenuity
and toil of the originator, or put it in the power of any subsequent
infringer to defeat the patent under the plea that the invention was
made by the assistant and not by the originator of the plan. 67
The court did not reach the issue of whether it could have
granted partial relief under a paradigm of law which more easily
admitted co-inventorship.
Again, the Supreme Court in the late 1800's mandated that the
invention had to be owned by a single contributor. This contributor
could be the principal employer, 68 or the employee, 69 but not both.
These holdings as to sole inventorship based on the "whole substance
of the improvement" are codependent on the premise of undivided
ownership of the patent rights, "because the real invention or
discovery belongs to the person who made the suggestions." 70 Again
the Court does not conceive of, and thus does not reach, analysis of
co-inventorship based on a possibility of divided ownership rights.
Precedents which dealt with the meaning of co-ownership rights
in a patent were factually based on situations where the issue at bar

66.

Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602-603 (1868).

67. Id. at 604.
68. See Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. 530, 563-564 (1874). "Where a person has
discovered a new and useful principle in a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, he
may employ other persons to assist in carrying out that principle, and if they, in the course of
experiments arising from that employment, make discoveries ancillary to the plan and
preconceived design of the employer, such suggested improvements are in general to be
regarded as the property of the party who discovered the original principle, and they may be
embodied in his patent as part of his invention."
69. Id. at 564. "[An employee is] entitled to [his] own independent inventions, and if the
suggestions communicated [by an employee to the employer] constitute the whole substance of
the improvement the employee is entitled to the invention and the patent if granted to the
employer is invalid, because the real invention or discovery belongs to the person who makes
the suggestions."

70. Id. at 564.
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was assignments and transfers, so that it was not necessary to reach
issues of joint ownership. For example, the Supreme Court held in
Washburn "[t]he language of the patent act, of 1836 ...refers to the
grant of an exclusive right in a patent, and the term 'exclusive'
comprehends.., an exclusive right to the whole patent .... The
action for the violation of an exclusive right is confined to the owner
of such a right."71 In Washburn the issues were whether the
ownership rights of a vested grantee of a patent owner survived the
death of the owner, and whether ownership of the granted rights were
exclusive and undivided. Although in Ethicon, the Federal Circuit
took an expansive reading of the text to apply to co-ownership
situations where strict co-inventorship was absent,72 the Washburn
statements are made in a context that restricts their applicability to
situations where there is strict single party inventorship and
ownership. The holdings prior to the 1984 amendment to § 116
assume a paradigm of codependency between strict requirements for a
single inventor and sole ownership of patent rights, and make sense
when read in a restrictive sense. But in order for the inventor to sue,
the assignment must undoubtedly convey to him the entire and
unqualified monopoly which the patentee held in the territory
specified - excluding the patentee himself, as well as others. Any
3
assignment short of this is a mere [nonexclusive] licensey
The predecessor court to the Federal Circuit expressed in dictum
a desire for more flexibility in dealing with the scope of ownership
rights of co-inventors when assignment or granting is not at issue. 74
Specifically, the court stated:
[O]ur presumption was that the situation might have been taken
care of by some proper procedure in the Patent Office during the
pending of the original application, and, it may be added, we
should feel that justice would be served if the reissue statute
75
admitted the relief which appellant prays.
V. OPTIONS FOR DEALING wrH CO-INVENTORsHIP/CO-OWNERSHIP
DISJOINT
If inventorship and ownership are separable issues, then co71.

Washburn, 29 Fed. Cas. at 316.

72.

See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.

73. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477,494-504 (1850).
74.

See In re Hamilton, 38 F.2d at 889, 890 (CCPA 1930) petitionfor rehearingdenied,

37 F.2d 758.
75.

Id.
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inventorship and concurrent ownership in the patent should be even
more separable. In other words, the rights of the model for joint
tenancy in real property need not be strictly analogized to joint
ownership in a patent, especially the rights of tenants in common to
undivided rights. It would be in the interest of integrity and equity for
courts to have freedom to fashion relief for the left out co-inventor
that is not restrained by concepts of common law real property rights.
Assuming that a court is not bound to apply rights of cotenants of real
property to co-owners of a patent, there are multiple options for relief
available for the court when it finds substantially unequal contribution
to some of the claims of a patent. Some options have precedential
history to recommend them. Others can be distinguished from
precedent after the amendment of § 116.
A. InvalidateAll the Claims of the Patent
The first option is for a court to continue the practice of
invalidating the entire patent when there is a dispute as to coinventorship and when the left out party sustains the burden of proof
of inventive contribution to at least one claim. By exercising this
option the court would give strict interpretation to the word "shall" in
§ 116 as meaning contributors to the invention must apply jointly to
benefit from the reduced restrictions on the substantial equality of
contribution afforded by § 116. Where the co-inventors failed to
apply jointly and there has not been a prior resolution of ownership
rights between them, the court would be giving interpretation to the
words "shall not" in § 256 2 as meaning that a patent cannot be
equitably corrected under § 256 by granting cotenancy rights where
there is substantial disparity between contributions." 76 Holding the
entire patent invalid can be more harsh on both co-inventors than
granting undivided rights to all co-inventors because in the latter
situation there are two entities sharing the monopoly, while in the
former situation the monopoly advantage is denied to all contributors.
However, the two inventors may be able to apply for new patents
covering the subject matter but severing the claims. The helpfulness
of this recourse is limited. Even if the inventors are not barred by
other patent law, particularly the bars of 35 U.S.C. § 102, such

76. See Collar Co., 90 U.S. at 562 (original patentee was not entitled to a patent either for
the paper or the process, as he never made sufficient invention or discovery upon the subject).
See also Stewart, 32 F. at 666 (joint patent on machine composed of twelve independent claims,
one claim having been found to be the invention of one joint patentee only, found invalid as to
all claims).
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recourse may not result in loss of some of the subject matter to either
or both of the co-inventors. One possible scenario which would
prevent subsequent patentability would be where both applicants'
patents simultaneously suffer from a 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) or (g) priority
bar.77 It would always be the case that the co-inventors would not
qualify for the 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) exception, as this exception is
available only for co-inventors who assigned rights to the same party
at the time of invention. 78 Each patent application must satisfy all the
requirements for patentability. Thus, severance of claims and
applications for the severed claims might not be equitable.
B. Sever the Claims of the Patent,Retaining the Undisputed
Claims
The second option is for a court to sever the claims rendered
invalid due to error of named inventors. The claims in which the sole
inventor was correctly named would retain validity and the owner
would be the sole inventor. The claims in which the co-contributor
was left out would be invalidated. In a case where severance of
claims was realistic, the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit
expressed a desire to do so, and order reissue for valid claims. 79
However, such a court-ordered invalidation of part of the patent with
validation of other claims of the patent, whether achieved through
reissue or some other mechanism, would still be subject to the logic
that invalidating part of the patent invalidates the entire patent. If
there are claims that are patentable, they can only be patented by the
procedures of the PTO reexamination, reissue, or new application.

77. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) "Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ...
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed
in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, ...
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by
another...."
78. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) "Conditions for patentability; ...
(c) Subject matter developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under
subsection (f) or (g) of section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section
where the subject matter and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made,
owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person."
79. See Hamilton, 37 F.2d at 758 ("'Justice would appear to warrant the reissue as
requested but reissues must be granted within the provisions of the statute.").
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C. Sever the Claims of the Patent,Subjecting the Valid Claims
to Reissue

The third option is for the court to hold the claims found to be
joint invention invalid. With respect to the undisputed claims, the
patentee could surrender the patent to the Patent Office for reissue
proceedings pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 251:
Reissue of defective patents: Whenever any patent is, through error
without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly
inoperative or invalid.... by reason of the patentee claiming more
or less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Commissioner
shall, on the surrender of such patent.... reissue the patent for the
invention disclosed in the original patent.., for the unexpired part
of the term of the original patent. No new matter shall be
introduced into the application for reissue.
The Commissioner may issue several reissued patents for distinct
and separate parts of the thing patented, upon demand of the
applicant...
The provisions of this title relating to applications for patent shall
be applicable to applications for reissue of a patent, except that
application for reissue may be made and swom to by the assignee
of the entire interest if the application does not seek to enlarge the
80
scope of the claims of the original patent.
This provision of the Code for reissue could equitably resolve
the situations where the co-invented claim is independent of the solely
invented claim, and all the claims are capable of reissue to the
patentee or reissue to the co-inventors. Each patent sought to be
reissued must satisfy all the requirements for patentability, including
co-inventorship issues. Thus, again, in circumstances where the
claims at issue are not capable of severance and separate patenting,
there may not be an equitable solution.
The effect of the above choices on the parties and the
relationship of the PTO is practically the same. When the remedy of
invalidating the patent is used by the court, the incidence of harshness
falls when inventors and co-inventors cannot negotiate and agree to
reapply for separate patents and cross license rights among
themselves. For example, the patentee can volunteer to disclaim
disputed claims. 8' Although there are no cases involving disclaimer
80. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1994) "Disclaimer. Whenever, without any deceptive intention, a
claim of a patent is invalid the remaining claims shall not thereby be rendered invalid. A

1999]

WINDFALL PROPERTY RIGHTS

of the disputed matter involving a § 256 defense/attack after the
amendment of § 116, it would seem that the owner of record could
effect statutory disclaimer, absent deceptive intent. After a court
ordered addition of a left out co-inventor, it is unsettled whether an
owner of the sectional interest of the undisputed claims could
disclaim the claims that were the subject matter of coinvention.
Tactically, it would seem that if the disputed claims form a
commercially unimportant element of the larger patent, the sole
patentee would more safely protect the more important and
undisputed part of his patent by disclaiming the disputed elements. In
order to retain rights in the disputed elements and to retain the
possibility of windfall benefits of rights in the entire patent, the
putative co-inventor would seek to block disclaimer by arguing
deceptive intent on the part of the patentee seeking disclaimer.
D. Add the Left Out Co-Inventorand GrantHim Undivided
Rights in All Claims
The fourth option is for a court to preserve validity of the patent,
but order correction of the named inventors to include the left out coinventor and grant equal and undivided ownership rights to each copatentee. 2 This action would be pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 256:
Correction of named inventor: ...The error of omitting inventors
or naming persons who are not inventors shall not invalidate the
patent in which such error occurred if it can be corrected as
provided in this section. The court before which such matter is
called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and
and the Commissioner shall issue a
hearing of all parties concerned
83
certificate accordingly.
The problem with this choice is that the left out co-inventor who
has been granted undivided rights in all the claims of the patent has a
tremendous windfall in terms of enhanced rights. This encourages
attacks on the patent by marginal contributors. The losing patentee is
denied the option to disclaim or amend the claims of his own patent
because he no longer is the sole owner of the patent rights. On the
other hand, the extent of ownership rights to the losing patentee are
established and limited by statute. If Congress has not expressed an
patentee, whether of the whole or any sectional interest therein, may... make disclaimer of any
complete claim."
82. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1465-66.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994). See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.324 (1998). Correction of inventorship
in patent.
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intent to define ownership fights with respect to named inventor and
newly-named co-inventor different from the equal and undivided
rights of tenancy in common, a court would not be obligated to
expand the rights of the losing named inventor at the expense of the
rights of the newly named inventor.
E. Limit Undivided Rights of the Newly Named Co-Inventorto
the Claims to Which He Contributed
The fifth option is for a court to preserve the validity of the
patent, but limit undivided rights to the left out co-inventor to just
those claims, or elements within claims, to which he contributed.
First, the precedential history cited above which grants undivided coownership rights to every named co-inventor is limited to cases in
which substantial, simultaneous contribution to each and every claim
applies. In situations where there are different contributions to
independent claims, as now allowed by the amendment to § 116, the
precedential history cited does not preclude other apportionment of
ownership rights between the co-inventors named under the new
scheme. Courts are empowered to correct inventorship by naming the
left out co-inventor to the patent, but are not required to grant rights in
every claim, by construction of the word "may" in 35 U.S.C. § 256.
A court is empowered by this section to direct correction of coinventorship in proper cases.Y4 Policy considerations of perceived
judicial equity and integrity of the patent system argue for balanced
realignment of rights between the patentee and the left out coinventor. This would allow the co-inventors to bargain among
themselves about the value of the co-invented claims. If the
coinvented claim is important to the whole invention, then the value
of the newly added co-inventor right reflects this. If the coinvented
claim is not important to the rest of the claimed invention, then the
value of the newly added co-inventor's ownership right is marginal.
There is less ability on the part of the newly named co-inventor to
reap windfall value by ownership rights to claims to which he did not
contribute under this option.
F. Grant Ownership Right Only to the Named Inventor and
Give the Left Out Co-InventorDamages
The sixth option is for a court to preserve the validity of the
patent, naming the left out co-inventor to the list of co-inventors.

84.

See St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., Inc., 403 F.Supp. 776 (S.D. M11.
1975).
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However, instead of granting undivided property rights, the court
would grant remedy in the form of damages based on an appraisal of
the value of the left out co-inventor's contribution to the whole
invention. If the analogy of the property rights of joint inventors to
the property rights of tenants in common no longer works justice in
particular situations, perhaps new jurisprudence analogous to
nuisance or implied contract would serve this situation better. 5
Remedies are provided in the Patent Act for infringement: 35 U.S.C.
§ 284:
Damages. Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of
the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as
fixed by the court. A court may consider constructive reverse
infringement of the co-inventor's contribution by the patentee, and
award compensation commensurate with the co-inventor's

contribution.

6

G. Grant Ownership Right Only to the Left Out Co-Inventor
and Give the Named InventorDamages
The seventh option is for the court to grant ownership rights to
the party most likely to economically exploit the invention, even if the
party was the co-inventor who contributed less. With this option the
court would distribute the commercial benefits of the patent to the
inventors and co-inventors in proportion to the importance of the
contribution of each. This would bring about efficient resource
allocation under circumstances where the named inventor contributed
to most of the invention, but he did not have as much ability to exploit
85. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). Coase
Theorem hypothesizes that the market will move the right to the use of highest economic value.
The court makes an initial allocation of rights as a combination of injunctive and damage relief
based on economic and other judicial considerations to maximize the social value of the right.
However, in patent property cases the initial allocation of rights will probably not transfer in a
way that maximizes the policy goal of patent law to advance technology through invention. The
named inventor has already determined to invest in his holdout position over negotiating a
license. The left out inventor has tremendous incentive to invest for a potential free ride on the
claims of the patent to which he did not contribute invention. When transaction costs are so
high, injunctive relief does not lead to negotiated resolutions that reflect maximization of social
value. That is, granting property rights to the newly named co-inventor to claims to which he
did not contribute does not promote the policy goal of patent law. It promotes litigation.
Leaving the ownership right to all the patent claims with the named inventor, while giving
damage remedy to the newly named co-inventor, would more appropriately allocate rights in
this situation, initially and ultimately.
86. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
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his ownership rights as the newly named co-inventor. The named coinventor would get the possible benefits of his invention. This would
maximize social value of technological progress by putting the
resource of inventions to their most valuable use. The court can be
most economically efficient by minimizing economic inertia caused
by high transaction costs when it initially allocates the benefits
incident to invention in a way that the parties would most likely
structure, absent the friction of patent transaction costs. That would
place most of the incidents of ownership in the hands of the entity
most able to exploit the invention, while compensating the party who
has relinquished ownership rights with economic benefit that he
would not have been able to realize anyway. However, when the
conflicting parties are competitors with similar interests and market
capabilities, this option may not be feasible for a court.
H. Grant Undivided Rights to Claims Not ContributedTo, But
Keep a High StandardTo Find Co-Inventorshipfor the
Claims That Were ContributedTo
The eighth choice is for a court to grant undivided ownership
right to claims that were not contributed to, but to display more
reluctance to name a left out contributor of minor claims to a patent in
cases where the left out co-contributor would get ownership rights in
more claims than to those to which he contributed. 7 As discussed
above, the standard for co-inventorship is interrelated with the scope
of the rights granted to co-inventors.88 With a higher standard for the
left out co-inventor who contributed to a minimum of the claims,
when there is such a disparity between what may be granted and what
was contributed, the loss of ownership right would fall upon the party
contributing substantially less to the whole invention. Although this
may be the practical judicial response to what is an otherwise
Draconian rule, it may prove difficult for a court to use the standard
of co-inventorship/assistantship as a proxy to allocate ownership
rights in complex patents. 89
This is an exhaustive list of options available for a court when it
allocates ownership rights of a left out collaborator.
Once
87. See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1468-69 (Newman, J., dissenting). Cf Hess v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (named inventor spared coownership on grounds putative co-inventor did not meet standard of conception necessary to

constitute co-inventorship).
88.

Supra, Section I, Background of Co-Inventorship.

89. See Pannu, 155 F.3d 1344 (arguably conclusory dictum in defense of the named
inventor).
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interdependency of the scope of co-inventorship and the scope of
patent ownership rights is recognized, then admitting the possibility
of modifying the cotenancy model of property rights for co-owners of
a patent, after the paradigm shift caused by the amendment of § 116
for co-inventors who did not previously agree to assignment of
ownership rights, results in more than one bright-line option for the
scope of award of property rights to the left out co-inventor who gets
let in to the patent by a court.
VI. THE OPTION EXERCISED
In deciding Ethicon, chronicled in the introduction to this article,
the Federal Circuit chose to exercise the fourth option above.90
Ethicon is the leading case after the 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. §
116 to adjudicate the extent of ownership rights for a newly named
co-inventor. The complex surgical instrument at issue was the subject
matter of fifty-five patent claims. The district court found that the left
out co-inventor had contributed invention to two of the claims. 91 The
possibilities for the manufacturers of the surgical instrument were
invalidation of the patent, which would initially remove the monopoly
for all parties, granting undivided rights to the left out co-inventor,
which would leave only two manufacturers with monopoly rights, and
apportion of the benefits relative to contribution to important claims.
The two-member majority held that there was sufficient evidence
to not overturn the District Court finding that co-inventorship existed
for some of the claims. 92 This co-inventorship status entitled the
newly named co-inventor to undivided rights in all of the claims of
the patent, including the claims to which he did not contribute. Both
the named inventor and the newly named co-inventor must join to
pursue an infringement claim. Since the infringement claim at issue
was against the engineer's assignee, the infringement suit was
dismissed for lack of joinder of all cotenants of the ownership right.
The majority's analysis was relatively straightforward. While
recognizing that questions of patent ownership are distinct from
questions of inventorship, the majority alluded to provisions in the
patent Code as interpreted by precedential holdings to justify their
presumption that each co-inventor "owns a pro rata undivided interest
'93
in the entire patent, no matter what their respective contributions.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Ethicon, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1461-1462.
Id.
Id. at 1465-66.
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The majority relied on § 116 "[joint inventors] do not [need to]
contribute to the subject matter of every claim of the patent, '94 § 261
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property," 95 and § 262
use of "joint owners" 96 to conclude that "a joint inventor as to even
one claim enjoys a presumption of ownership in the entire patent." 97
Thus, this case stands for the rule that after amendment of § 116, a
left out "co-inventor of only one claim might gain entitlement to
ownership of a patent with dozens of claims." 98 The majority
examined no further whether it was equitable or within the intent of
Congress to correct inventorship of an issued patent by adding a coinventor to undivided ownership who did not have the traditional
attribute of substantial simultaneous contribution to each claim of the
patent.
Further analysis raises the questions posed above. Although §
261 provides for patents to have attributes of personal property, the
statute does not make explicit an exhaustive list of those attributes
which shall apply to patents. As analyzed above, case law presents
the proposition that patent ownership rights include the undivided
interest attribute of concurrent ownership in property held as tenants
in common, but only in the traditional context of substantial
collaboration to each element of the invention. 9 This distinguishes
the precedential history from the circumstances in the case at bar.
Besides failing to specify which attributes of ownership accrue to a
patent held by co-inventors, §261 is explicitly concerned with
assignments, transfers, and notice, and not undivided interests in the
context at issue. Further §262 provides as to joint owners: "In the
absence of any agreement to the contrary, each of the joint owners of
a patent may make, use, offer to sell, or sell the patented invention
within the United States, or import the patented invention into the
United States, without the consent of and without accounting to the
other owners."'0 In relying on the literal reading of this section, the
majority relied on its underlying assumption of the equivalence of
invention and patent ownership. Thus, the majority holding in
Ethicon chose the model of undivided rights, but the minority
94. 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1994).
95. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
96. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).
97. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1466.
98. Id. (dictum since the issue at bar is a left out co-inventor who contributed to more than
one claim).
99. See infra, Part I.

100.

35 U.S.C. § 262 (1994).
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recognized that to do so was inequitable, at least without further
analysis of the options that were left open to the litigants.
This inequity makes a § 256 attack on the patent a very attractive
action for a minor contributor who was not included in the list of
patentees and for whom there was no prior assignment agreement.
The courts are likely to see § 256 used as a defense against charges of
infringement or as an attack to secure co-ownership rights in a
valuable patent again. The accused infringer used a § 256 attack in
Pannu to pursue an even greater advantage, sole inventorship and
ownership of the patent at issue. 101 Whereas in Ethicon, the alleged
infringer used a § 256 defense to gain a co-monopoly, in Pannu the
alleged infringer attempted to combine a § 256 defense with claims of
a §102(b) violation'0 2 to claim sole ownership of the patent. Echoing
the circumstances in Ethicon of a single inventor developing a
complex medical device seeking input without prior assignment of
patent right agreement, an eye surgeon developed a complex surgical
device. The claimed device was an intraocular lens intended to be
inserted into human eyes after cataract removal. The invention was
directed at solving the problem of iris tissue snag on the lens
stabilizing structures which was encountered during insertion of the
lens into the eye. 10 An intraocular lens manufacturer, interested in
constructing this device from a single piece of plastic, suggested
manufacturing the surgeon's particular intraocular lens as a one piece
unit. The patent issued to the surgeon reciting eleven claims. In
addition to the core of the invention, the structure of the intraocular
lens that enabled snag free insertion and stable placement, the claims
recited elements of "one piece construction," with "uninterrupted,
continuously, smoothly curved outer periphery," which were
"integrally formed," "said flexible elements and said snag-resistance
means [being] made from a clear material," with "said elements
def'm[ing] a continuously curved arc."'0 4 The problem with the claims
101. Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
102. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to
patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless ...
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application
for patent in the United States."
103. The stabilizing means intended to fix the implant in proper position in the eye
(haptics) at the time of the invention were arc-shaped filaments, each of which drilled into the
lens (optic) at one end and having a free end which end tended to snag the delicate eye tissue
upon insertion and positioning inside the eye during surgery.
104. U.S. Patent Number Re. 32,525. (Claim 10 independently claims a device for
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was that they were unnecessarily limited if the only subject matter
was the snag free shape of the free ends of the stabilizing means.
Either one piece construction or three piece construction (with the
hard, clear lens optic being made out of different material than the
flexible lens haptics), which was standard in the relevant art at the
time, would have satisfied the novelty requirements for patentability.
The one-piece element was incidental. The accused intraocular lens
manufacturer claimed coinvention based on contribution of the onepiece aspect of the intraocular lens. Rather than settling for coinventorship of the entire patent, the accused infringer asserted sole
invention of the "one pieced-ness" and claimed it was the only novel
aspect of the described invention. The manufacturer asserted that the
named patentee placed snag resistant haptics into the prior art. The
one piece elements constituted a valid patent, for which the
manufacturer was the sole inventor. The Court held that the accused
infringer's claim to co-inventorship was substantial enough to require
that the matter be placed before a jury, but not enough to hold that he
was the sole inventor. 05 As a rationale, the court asserted that it was
undisputed that the surgeon's contribution to the one piece element
was sufficient to require him to be named co-inventor rather than
assistant. Further, the court asserted that it was undisputed that the
two had collaborated. 0 6 The problem here is that the court did not
need to reach these issues and the analysis appears to be unnecessarily
conclusory. There was in the art, at the time of the collaboration, a
significant independence between the structure of the surgeon's lens
and one piece construction. A reasonable jury could conclude as a
matter of fact that the surgeon did not contribute significantly to the
one piece construction. There is enough factual basis that the matter
should not be decided as a matter of law, but the proponents were
barred from presenting that argument.
In unnecessarily issuing dicta on a matter that it inadequately
explored in a conclusory fashion, it is possible that the court is
attempting to soften the harsh effect of the rule in Ethicon on the
named inventor in Pannu. This is the eighth option, above. That is,
in order to protect the patentee from the inequitable erosion of
property rights that results from a successful § 256 attack, the court is
changing the standard for co-inventorship.
In this case it is

measuring internal ocular dimensions that was unrelated to the structure or composition of the
intraocular lens device that is the subject matter of the other claims.)
105. Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351.
106. Id.
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attempting by dicta to ensure as a matter of law the standard for coinventorship for the patentee is low enough that he will not be
disqualified from his own invention. In so doing the court is usurping
the role of the fact finder. The effect of the draconian ruling in
Ethicon may not be limited to its parties; Ethicon may be having
effects on progeny cases in an effort to re-establish a more equitable
balance between the interests of the parties where it is the rule that the
cotenancy model of property will be established in every claim for a
left out co-inventor.
VII. RESTORING PERCEIVED EQUITY AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

There is a perceived inequity in granting a newly-named coinventor undivided ownership rights to all the elements of a patented
invention, even as to those elements to which he did not contribute.
The question is what changes can be made in the patent law system to
encourage the judiciary to find more equitable and economic
solutions.
First, the judiciary need not feel so constrained by precedent in
interpreting the statute under a distinguishable paradigm to equate coinventorship with concurrent ownership of property, applying all the
rules of tenancy in common of real property and chattel. This would
free the judiciary to consider naming a left out co-inventor to the
patent, but granting remedies other than undivided interest in the
property. This would enable Choice 6 above to fashion more
equitable remedies.
Second, to allay court reluctance in this area of law that is
primarily statutory, Congress should express an intent that the 1984
amendment to § 116 was aimed at easing the co-inventorship
restrictions for modem institutional research. Congress should make
explicit whether it intends to grant undivided ownership rights in all
claims of a patent to co-inventors of minor claims who are
subsequently named to the patent.
Third, Congress should extend the exceptional benefits of §
103(c) to collaborators who did not work for the same employer, but
were subsequently named as co-inventors pursuant to court order
This would make it more likely that arguing
under §256.
collaborators would seek reissue and reapplication, rather than
litigation.
Fourth, the Patent Office should allow reissue proceedings,
including correction of inventorship, whether or not litigation is
pending. The claims which are not the subject matter of co-
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inventorship would be the basis for one divisional application, 10 7 and
the claims which are the subject matter of co-inventorship would form
the basis for another divisional application, with correction of
inventorship adding the co-inventor to the latter application. 10
Reissue proceedings by the Patent Office that allow correction of
inventorship to reflect the 1984 amendment to § 116 would encourage
the courts to stay litigation pending reissuance resolving the conflict
between the parties. Further, this would encourage disagreeing
parties to work out more equitable settlements dividing rights to
claims without resorting to judicial intervention.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Concepts of inventorship and patent ownership are separate but
interdependent. Co-Inventorship and undivided patent ownership
rights comprise a sensible paradigm when there is substantially equal,
simultaneous contribution to each claim of the invention by both of
the contributing inventors. Congress changed the contribution moiety
of the paradigm with the amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 116 in 1984. As
amended, § 116 allows for patents to name as co-inventors
collaborators who did not contribute at the same time in the same
way, to different claims. To not change the ownership moiety of the
paradigm in cases where amended § 116 requires addition of a left out
co-inventor to the patent results in inequity and economic inefficiency
that frustrates the purpose of patent law. A left out co-inventor
subsequently named to the patent under amended § 116 obtains the
windfall of valuable ownership rights to claims to which he did not
contribute. In this situation, courts can rely on precedents for
freedom to fashion more equitable and economically efficient relief.
Likewise, Congress can statutorily free the courts to grant more
equitable solutions. Finally, the Patent Office can modify regulations
to facilitate correction of inventorship in reissue proceedings, even if
the parties are engaged in litigation.

107.

37 C.F.R. § 1.53(d) (1999). A divisional application is an application for a patentably

distinct invention carved out of a pending application (the parent), including reissue, and
claiming only subject matter disclosed in the parent application.
108. 37 C.FR. § 1.48(a) (1999). Correction of inventorship is currently not available under
§1.48(b) for a reissue application.
This restriction is a reflection of the historical
interdependence of inventorship and ownership. Although 37 C.F.R. § 1.45 was amended to
reflect the amendment in 35 U.S.C. § 116, Rule 1.48 has not been changed.

